

Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's Interpretation of Abrogation (Naskh–Mansūkh) in Qur'an 2:106 from a Sociology of Knowledge Perspective

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Abstract

The concept of *naskh–mansūkh* (abrogation) has long remained one of the most contested issues in '*Ulūm al-Qur'ān*', particularly with regard to its methodological legitimacy and epistemological implications in Qur'anic interpretation. This study critically examines the construction of *naskh–mansūkh* in Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's interpretation of Qur'an 2:106 in *Tafsir an-Nur* by employing Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as its analytical framework. The primary objective of this research is to uncover how the meaning of *naskh* is produced, negotiated, and reconfigured within the socio-intellectual context of post-independence Indonesia. Adopting a qualitative-descriptive design grounded in library research, the study applies discourse analysis to Qur'anic exegesis, situating the interpretive text within the historical position of the exegete and the dynamics of Islamic intellectual tradition. Primary data are drawn from *Tafsir an-Nur*, supported by classical exegetical sources, Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's intellectual writings, and theoretical works on the sociology of knowledge. The findings demonstrate that Hasbi al-Shiddiqie does not conceptualize *naskh–mansūkh* as the literal annulment of Qur'anic rulings or texts, but rather as a process of contextualization and semantic reconciliation aimed at preserving the enduring normative relevance of revelation. From a Mannheimian perspective, this interpretive stance reflects a pattern of *relationism*, in which the meaning of *naskh* emerges through a dialectical engagement between classical exegetical authority and the social demands of modern Indonesian society. This study argues that *naskh–mansūkh* in *Tafsir an-Nur* represents a socially situated intellectual construction that embodies an effort toward exegetical reform without undermining the authority of the Qur'anic text. By doing so, the article contributes to Indonesian Qur'anic studies and advances broader discussions on the interplay between interpretation, social context, and epistemic authority in Islamic scholarship.

Keywords: Hasbi al-Shiddiqie, *Naskh–Mansūkh*, *Tafsir an-Nur*; Sociology of Knowledge, Karl Mannheim.

Abstrak

Konsep *naskh–mansūkh* merupakan salah satu isu paling klasik dan kontroversial dalam studi '*Ulūm al-Qur'ān*', terutama terkait legitimasi metodologis dan implikasi epistemologisnya dalam praktik penafsiran Al-Qur'an. Penelitian ini mengkaji secara kritis konstruksi makna *naskh–mansūkh* dalam penafsiran QS al-Baqarah [2]:106 pada *Tafsir an-Nur* karya Hasbi al-



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Shiddiqie, dengan menempatkannya dalam kerangka sosiologi pengetahuan Karl Mannheim. Tujuan utama penelitian ini adalah mengungkap bagaimana konsep *naskh* diproduksi, dinegosiasikan, dan dimaknai dalam relasinya dengan konteks sosial-intelektual Indonesia modern pascakemerdekaan. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif-deskriptif berbasis studi kepustakaan, dengan metode analisis wacana tafsir yang memposisikan teks tafsir dalam keterkaitannya dengan latar historis, posisi intelektual mufasir, serta dinamika tradisi pengetahuan Islam. Data primer bersumber dari *Tafsir an-Nur*, didukung oleh literatur tafsir klasik, karya-karya Hasbi al-Shiddiqie, serta kajian teoretis sosiologi pengetahuan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Hasbi al-Shiddiqie tidak memahami *naskh–mansūkh* sebagai penghapusan literal terhadap hukum atau teks Al-Qur'an, melainkan sebagai mekanisme kontekstualisasi dan rekonsiliasi makna yang bertujuan menjaga relevansi normatif wahyu dalam perubahan sosial. Dalam perspektif Mannheim, penafsiran tersebut merepresentasikan pola *relationism*, di mana makna *naskh* lahir dari dialektika antara otoritas tafsir klasik dan tuntutan sosial masyarakat Indonesia modern. Studi ini menegaskan bahwa konsep *naskh–mansūkh* dalam *Tafsir an-Nur* merupakan konstruksi sosial-intelektual yang mencerminkan upaya pembaruan tafsir tanpa melepaskan legitimasi teks wahyu, sekaligus berkontribusi pada penguatan kajian tafsir Indonesia melalui pendekatan sosiologi pengetahuan yang bersifat kritis, kontekstual, dan dialogis.

Kata kunci: Hasbi al-Shiddiqie, *Naskh–Mansūkh*, *Tafsir an-Nur*, Sosiologi Pengetahuan, Karl Mannheim.

Introduction

The Qur'an is believed to be a perfect, final, and internally consistent divine revelation. Nevertheless, the history of its interpretation has witnessed the development of the doctrine of *naskh–mansūkh*, which assumes the abrogation or annulment of certain Qur'anic rulings by others. This paradox has generated a fundamental controversy in Qur'anic exegetical studies: how can a sacred text regarded as absolute be understood through a mechanism of abrogation that effectively negates part of its normative message? In the classical literature of '*ulūm al-Qur'ān*, *naskh* is generally defined as the abrogation or annulment of a previous legal ruling, while *mansūkh* refers to a ruling that is considered no longer applicable (Faruq et al., 2024). Although this concept has long been institutionalized, its methodological and epistemological implications continue to be debated to this day.

Within the classical exegetical tradition, the doctrine of *naskh–mansūkh* was accepted as a divine mechanism that enabled Islamic law to adapt to changing social circumstances during the period of revelation. However, in the development of contemporary Islamic thought, this paradigm has increasingly been called into question. A number of scholars argue that understanding *naskh* as the abrogation of Qur'anic verses risks undermining the internal coherence of the Qur'an and obstructs efforts to render it relevant to modern ethical values, such as human rights and social justice. Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im, for instance, proposes a re-evaluation of the doctrine of *naskh* by reversing its conventional logic, namely by

positioning the universal Makkan verses as the normative foundation of contemporary Islamic law (Asman, 2021). This approach represents a broader global reformist trend in Qur'anic studies that emphasizes the ethical and contextual relevance of revelation.

In line with this trend, contextual hermeneutical approaches have gained increasing prominence in modern Qur'anic studies. Such approaches stress the importance of understanding Qur'anic verses in relation to their social, political, and cultural contexts, so that the message of revelation remains responsive to contemporary issues such as social justice and equality (Ichwan et al., 2025). However, the application of modern hermeneutics has also provoked sharp debates between traditionalist and modernist camps. Traditionalists criticize hermeneutics for allegedly reducing the divine status of the Qur'an by treating it as an ordinary literary text, whereas modernists regard reinterpretation as an unavoidable necessity in responding to the challenges of changing times (Amir et al., 2024). This debate demonstrates that Qur'anic interpretation is never neutral; rather, it is always situated within a dynamic tension between religious authority and social change.

In the Indonesian context, this dynamic finds a significant articulation in the thought of Teuku Muhammad Hasbi al-Shiddiqie. Through *Tafsir an-Nur*, Hasbi consistently rejected the understanding of *naskh* as the abrogation of Qur'anic verses. He maintained that all verses retain their normative validity insofar as they are interpreted contextually and oriented toward the ethical objectives of revelation (Aziz, 2018). This position is reflected in his legal views on issues such as polygamy and interreligious marriage, where he emphasized principles of justice, public welfare (*maṣlahah*), and the prevention of harm as the basis of Islamic legal interpretation (Razali Ibrahim, 2023). Thus, Hasbi's critique of *naskh–mansūkh* is not merely abstract or theoretical, but is rooted in practical concerns regarding the social and ethical implications of Islamic law.

Hasbi's thought may also be situated within the broader landscape of modern Islamic intellectual discourse. Thinkers such as Fazlur Rahman, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Muhammad Mujtahed Shabestari emphasize the active role of human agency—including that of the Prophet Muhammad—in the process of revelation and textual understanding, and they advocate a humanistic approach to the Qur'an (Alak, 2024). This perspective reinforces the argument that the meaning of revelation is not static, but is continually produced through the interaction between text, interpreter, and social context.

Although Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's views on *naskh–mansūkh* have been addressed in several studies, previous research has largely remained descriptive and normative in character.

These studies tend to portray Hasbi as a reformist exegete without systematically analyzing how his social context, historical experience, and intellectual position shaped the construction of his knowledge, particularly in his interpretation of Q. al-Baqarah [2]:106, which is frequently cited as the primary textual basis for the doctrine of *naskh*. Consequently, the social-epistemological dimension of Hasbi's critique of *naskh-mansūkh* has received relatively limited scholarly attention.

This article seeks to address this gap by analyzing the concept of *naskh* in Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's interpretation of Q. al-Baqarah [2]:106 in *Tafsir an-Nur* through the lens of Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. Within Mannheim's framework, knowledge—including religious interpretation—is understood as a product conditioned by specific social and historical contexts (Gábor, 2019). Through the concepts of ideology and utopia, Mannheim demonstrates that religious ideas may function either to preserve existing social orders or to transform them (Hammersley, 2022; Hempel, 2019).

On this basis, the article advances two research questions: (1) how does Hasbi al-Shiddiqie reinterpret the concept of *naskh* in his exegesis of Q. al-Baqarah [2]:106? and (2) how does Hasbi's socio-intellectual context shape his critique of the classical doctrine of *naskh-mansūkh*? This study proceeds from the initial hypothesis that Hasbi's rejection of *naskh-mansūkh* constitutes a relational and dynamic form of interpretation, consistent with the view that religious knowledge continually evolves in response to societal change (Abdelnour, 2023). Accordingly, this study is expected to contribute to Qur'anic exegetical scholarship in Indonesia while also demonstrating the relevance of the sociology of knowledge for understanding the dynamics of contemporary Qur'anic interpretation.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research approach grounded in library-based research, as its primary objective is to interpret and contextualize meaning rather than to measure variables quantitatively. The qualitative design is particularly suitable for examining Qur'anic exegesis, where meaning is produced through interpretive engagement with texts and shaped by socio-historical contexts. Accordingly, this research focuses on understanding how the concept of *naskh* is constructed, argued, and positioned within Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's exegetical framework.

The central unit of analysis in this study is Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's interpretation of Qur'an al-Baqarah [2]:106 in *Tafsir an-Nur*. This verse is selected because it is widely regarded as the primary textual foundation for the doctrine of *naskh-mansūkh* in classical Qur'anic

scholarship. By concentrating on a single, pivotal verse within a major Indonesian tafsir, the study is able to conduct an in-depth and focused analysis of Hasbi's interpretive strategy. In addition to the exegetical text itself, the study also considers Hasbi's broader socio-intellectual background as part of the analytical unit, in line with the sociology of knowledge perspective.

The data used in this research consist of both primary and secondary sources. The primary data are drawn from *Tafsir an-Nur*, specifically the section dealing with the interpretation of QS al-Baqarah [2]:106. This text is treated as the main source through which Hasbi's conceptualization of *naskh* is examined. Secondary data include Hasbi's other relevant writings, scholarly studies on *naskh-mansūkh*, works on modern Qur'anic hermeneutics, and theoretical literature on Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. These secondary sources function to contextualize, support, and critically engage the analysis of the primary text.

Data collection is conducted through systematic documentation and close textual reading of the selected sources. The process involves identifying key passages in *Tafsir an-Nur* related to *naskh*, tracing Hasbi's argumentative patterns, and compiling relevant scholarly discussions that illuminate both the exegetical and theoretical dimensions of the study. Given the textual and conceptual nature of the research, empirical methods such as interviews, observations, or focus group discussions are not employed. Instead, analytical depth is achieved through careful hermeneutical engagement with written sources.

Data analysis is carried out through a combination of exegetical discourse analysis and the sociology of knowledge framework proposed by Karl Mannheim. The analysis proceeds in three interrelated stages. First, Hasbi's interpretation of *naskh* in QS al-Baqarah [2]:106 is examined to identify its key concepts, arguments, and interpretive strategies, particularly his rejection of literal abrogation and his preference for contextual reconciliation (*tawfiq*). Second, these textual findings are interpreted in relation to Hasbi's socio-historical and intellectual context, drawing on Mannheim's notion that knowledge is socially conditioned. This stage seeks to explain why Hasbi's critique of *naskh-mansūkh* emerged and how it reflects the concerns of his time. Third, the results are situated within broader debates on Qur'anic interpretation and Islamic legal reform to assess the significance and contribution of Hasbi's approach.

Through this methodological framework, the study not only addresses what Hasbi says about *naskh*, but also explains how his interpretation is produced and why it takes the particular form it does. In doing so, the methodology supports the article's broader aim of

demonstrating the analytical value of the sociology of knowledge for understanding the dynamics of contemporary Qur'anic exegesis.

Results and Discussion

A. Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's Interpretation of Naskh–Mansūkh in Tafsir an-Nur

An analysis of exegetical literature and the works of Teuku Muhammad Hasbi al-Shiddiqie reveals three dominant patterns in the discourse on naskh–mansūkh. The first is the classical-normative pattern, which accepts naskh as a mechanism for the abrogation of legal rulings based on both transmitted (*naql*) and rational (*'aql*) evidence. The second is the reformist-contextual pattern, which rejects literal abrogation and emphasizes the reconciliation of Qur'anic verses. The third is the moderative-structural pattern, which acknowledges limited forms of naskh in the sense of *takhsīs* (specification) and *taqyīd* (qualification), rather than the annulment of legal rulings. Hasbi al-Shiddiqie consistently aligns himself with the latter two patterns, distinguishing his position from the dominant tendency of classical scholars (Anshori, 2019; Ummam et al., 2024.).

Textually, the majority of classical scholars ground the legitimacy of naskh primarily in Qur'an 2:106 and Qur'an 16:101, which are understood as explicit evidence of the replacement of verses and legal rulings. This interpretation positions God as the ultimate agent who "abrogates" previous rulings in the interest of public welfare (*maslahah*) (Syaifudin, 2019). Within this argumentative structure, apparent contradictions between verses are resolved through abrogation, resulting in one verse losing its normative authority when confronted with another verse deemed to have been revealed later (Ummam et al., 2024).

In contrast to this structure, Hasbi al-Shiddiqie rejects the interpretation of Qur'an 2:106 as a justification for the abrogation of Qur'anic verses. He argues that the term *āyah* in the verse does not necessarily refer to a legal verse, but may instead denote a miracle or the process by which revelation was transferred from the *Lawh al-Mahfūz* into the written *muṣḥaf* (As-Shiddiqy, 2009b). Structurally, this argument shifts the focus of naskh away from legal annulment toward the domains of interpretation and the history of revelation.

The findings indicate that the classical doctrine of naskh functions ideologically to normalize a hierarchy of exegetical authority, whereby early *mufassirūn* and jurists possess the power to determine which verses remain operative and which are deemed abrogated. Hasbi challenges this structure by asserting that no Qur'anic verse ever loses its normative authority. He rejects claims of mansūkh verses in the absence of unequivocal (*qatī*) textual evidence

from the Qur'an or authentic ḥadīth (Aziz, 2018). In doing so, Hasbi effectively deconstructs established power relations within the classical exegetical tradition.

The results further demonstrate that classical approaches to naskh tend to marginalize the socio-historical contexts of verses perceived as contradictory. In Hasbi's exegesis, verses frequently identified as mansūkh—such as Qur'an 8:65–66 or Qur'an 73:17 and 20—are instead understood as contextual responses to changing conditions within the Muslim community, rather than as instances of legal cancellation (Iman, 2019). Such contextual considerations are often absent from literalist readings of naskh.

Textual evidence from Hasbi's works explicitly affirms that "all Qur'anic verses are muḥkamāt and must be implemented" (As-Shiddieqy, 2009b). At the same time, Hasbi acknowledges limited forms of naskh understood as legal specification and qualification (*takhsīṣ* and *taqyīd*). One example is the shift from the general prohibition of blood consumption in Qur'an 5:3 to the more specific restriction on flowing blood in Qur'an 6:145, which he does not regard as legal abrogation (Fadhilah, 2016).

A comparison between classical exegesis and Hasbi's interpretation reveals a fundamental divergence. Classical tafsir prioritizes legal abrogation as the primary solution to textual conflict, whereas Hasbi emphasizes harmonization and reinterpretation. While the classical approach tends to foreclose alternative meanings, Hasbi's approach allows for continuous contextualization without undermining the authority of the Qur'anic text. This contrast underscores Hasbi's position as a reformist exegete within the Indonesian tafsir tradition.

In summary, the findings indicate that Hasbi al-Shiddiqie: (1) rejects naskh as the annulment of Qur'anic verses; (2) interprets Qur'an 2:106 in a non-abrogative manner; (3) accepts limited forms of naskh as legal specification rather than cancellation; and (4) places socio-historical context at the center of reconciling Qur'anic verses. These conclusions are drawn directly from Hasbi's writings and supported by relevant secondary literature (Aziz, 2018; Ummam et al., 2024).

Taken together, these findings suggest that the concept of naskh in *Tafsir an-Nur* is not merely a technical issue of exegetical methodology, but is deeply intertwined with the construction of knowledge, scholarly authority, and social context. Consequently, these results open the way for further analysis through Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, particularly in examining how Hasbi's social position and historical experience shaped his

critique of *naskh*–*mansūkh*. This analytical perspective will be developed further in the Discussion section.

B. Non-Abrogative and Contextual Dynamics of *Naskh* in *Tafsir an-Nur*

The findings presented above reveal a consistent pattern in Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's approach to *naskh*, namely the systematic rejection of *naskh* as the literal abrogation or annulment of Qur'anic verses. Rather than viewing *naskh* as a hierarchical mechanism through which later revelations invalidate earlier ones, Hasbi conceptualizes it as a contextual and interpretive strategy aimed at preserving the internal coherence and enduring relevance of the Qur'an. This pattern aligns closely with broader contemporary interpretations of *naskh*, which emphasize reconciliation, specification, and social adaptability instead of textual cancellation (Asman, 2021; Yaşar & Nas, 2022; Abdul-Rahim, 2017).

Within this framework, *naskh* is primarily understood in three interrelated ways. First, it functions as reconciliation of verses (*tawfiq*), whereby apparent contradictions between Qur'anic passages are resolved through interpretive harmonization rather than abrogation. This approach seeks to maintain the integrity of the Qur'an as a coherent and internally consistent revelation, a concern shared by many contemporary scholars who reject literal abrogation (Asman, 2021). Hasbi explicitly endorses this method, arguing that conflicting verses should be interpreted contextually so that *naskh* becomes unnecessary (As-Shiddieqy, 2009b).

Second, *naskh* is redefined as legal specification and qualification (*takhsīs* and *taqyīd*), not as the removal of legal authority. In this sense, general rulings are refined or limited in scope to address particular circumstances, without negating their original normative force. This understanding is consistent with contemporary jurisprudential interpretations that regard *naskh* as a tool for contextualizing legal norms rather than abolishing them (Yaşar & Nas, 2022). Hasbi explicitly accepts this “second version” of *naskh* recognized by some fuqahā', in which a general text remains valid but is specified or restricted in application (As-Shiddieqy, 2009b).

Third, *naskh* is framed as a response to social change, reflecting the dynamic interaction between revelation and evolving social realities. Contemporary perspectives emphasize that Qur'anic guidance responds to concrete historical and social conditions, allowing Islamic law to adapt to new circumstances without implying textual deficiency (Abdul-Rahim, 2017). Hasbi's interpretation clearly resonates with this view, as he insists that

Islamic law must remain applicable across time and place through interpretation and contextualization, not through the annulment of Qur'anic verses.

This pattern stands in marked contrast to the classical hierarchical conception of *naskh*, in which later revelations are assumed to possess greater legal authority and thus override earlier rulings. Classical scholarship often treats *naskh* within a rigid framework of textual hierarchy, prioritizing chronology and legal finality over interpretive reconciliation (Langermann, 2024). Such an approach is closely tied to a strictly legalistic orientation, where the primary concern is determining which rulings remain legally operative, frequently without sufficient attention to broader interpretive or socio-historical contexts (Burton, 2019).

By contrast, Hasbi's approach reflects a broader shift from text-centered authority to context-aware authority. Legal meaning is no longer derived solely from textual hierarchy, but from the interaction between text, context, and ethical objectives. This shift also entails a movement from static legalism toward dynamic interpretation, in which Qur'anic norms are continually re-engaged in light of changing social realities. Hasbi's rejection of *naskh* as cancellation is grounded in his conviction that the Qur'an is an eternal and flawless source of guidance, making the notion of internal legal annulment theologically and epistemologically problematic (As-Shiddieqy, 2009b).

The pattern identified here is further reinforced by Hasbi's interpretation of Qur'an 2:106 in *Tafsir an-Nur*. Rather than understanding the term *āyah* in this verse as referring to legal rulings subject to abrogation, Hasbi interprets it as denoting miracles or the replacement of previous scriptures, such as the Torah, by the Qur'an (Irfanuddin & N, 2023). In this reading, the verse does not authorize the abrogation of Qur'anic law, but instead affirms God's power to replace signs or revelations without implying contradiction or error within the Qur'an itself. This interpretation supports Hasbi's broader claim that no Qur'anic verse remains recited while its ruling is annulled, a position he considers incompatible with the Qur'an's claim to perfection and consistency.

Taken together, these findings demonstrate that *naskh* in *Tafsir an-Nur* operates not as a juridical doctrine of cancellation, but as an epistemological mechanism for negotiating meaning, authority, and relevance. The shift from hierarchical abrogation to contextual reconciliation marks a significant transformation in the understanding of *naskh*, positioning Hasbi's tafsir firmly within modern reformist currents of Islamic thought. This pattern provides a crucial foundation for further interpretation through Karl Mannheim's sociology of

knowledge, particularly in examining how Hasbi's social background and historical context shaped his non-abrogative conception of *naskh*.

C. Hasbi's Naskh through Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge

Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge provides a critical theoretical lens for interpreting Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's conception of *naskh*. Mannheim argues that knowledge is never neutral or value-free, but is always socially and historically conditioned by the position, interests, and experiences of those who produce it (Vandenbergh, 2025; Hoenig, 2025). From this perspective, ideas cannot be adequately understood without situating them within the socio-historical context in which they emerge. Meaning, therefore, is not absolute, but relational, contingent upon social location and historical circumstances (Vasegh & Mohammadi, 2022; Gábor, 2019).

Viewed through Mannheim's framework, Hasbi's interpretation of *naskh* exemplifies what Mannheim terms relationism. Relationism does not deny truth claims outright, but emphasizes that the meaning and function of an idea shift according to context. In this sense, Hasbi's refusal to accept *naskh* as literal abrogation reflects an understanding that Qur'anic interpretation must remain responsive to the lived realities of the Muslim community. *Naskh* is thus no longer treated as a fixed doctrinal rule, but as a contextual interpretive mechanism whose meaning changes in relation to social conditions and intellectual needs.

This relational approach becomes clearer when Hasbi's critique of *naskh* is juxtaposed with Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia. Mannheim conceptualizes ideology as a form of knowledge that stabilizes existing social and intellectual structures, often serving to preserve established authority. By contrast, utopian thought challenges dominant frameworks and opens possibilities for transformation (Hoenig, 2025; Burke, 2019). Within this schema, classical theories of *naskh* can be read as ideological, insofar as they reinforce hierarchical interpretive authority by privileging earlier juristic consensus and legitimizing the power of classical exegetes to determine which verses remain operative (Langermann, 2024; Burton, 2019).

Hasbi's interpretation, by contrast, exhibits a utopian-reformative orientation. His rejection of *naskh* as textual cancellation constitutes a direct critique of the absolutization of classical interpretive authority. By insisting that no Qur'anic verse loses its normative validity, Hasbi challenges the ideological assumption that legal hierarchy within the Qur'an is necessary for doctrinal coherence. Instead, he proposes *tawfiq*, *takhsis*, and *taqyid* as

interpretive strategies that preserve the integrity of the text while allowing legal meaning to adapt dynamically to changing contexts (As-Shiddieqy, 2009b).

This reformative impulse is inseparable from Hasbi's social and intellectual background, which Mannheim would regard as a decisive factor in shaping his thought. Hasbi's upbringing in a deeply religious Acehnese family, his pesantren-based education, and his later engagement with reformist institutions such as Al-Irsyad contributed to a worldview that combined strong reverence for the Qur'an with a critical attitude toward rigid legalism (Ash-Shiddiqy, 2000). His active participation in political and academic institutions, including his role in Masyumi and his tenure at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, further exposed him to debates on law, authority, and national identity in post-colonial Indonesia (Irfanuddin, 2023).

From a sociological perspective, Hasbi's insistence that Islamic law is dynamic and context-sensitive reflects the historical conditions of Indonesian Muslim society in the early and mid-twentieth century. Living in a period marked by limited educational access, legal stagnation, and the uncritical adoption of Middle Eastern fiqh paradigms, Hasbi perceived the equation of divine *shari'a* with medieval jurisprudence as a fundamental obstacle to intellectual and social progress (Adnir & Syukri, 2020; Ash-Shiddiqy, 2000). His critique of *naskh* thus emerges not merely as a textual disagreement, but as a response to what he viewed as the socio-legal misalignment between inherited doctrines and Indonesian Muslim realities.

This sociological conditioning is also evident in Hasbi's interpretation of Qur'an 2:106 in *Tafsir an-Nur*. While many classical scholars invoke this verse as textual proof of abrogation, Hasbi reinterprets *āyah* as referring to miracles or to the replacement of previous scriptures, rather than to Qur'anic legal rulings (As-Shiddieqy, 2009a; Irfanuddin & N, 2023). By doing so, he relocates the discussion of *naskh* from the domain of legal hierarchy to that of revelatory history, thereby neutralizing claims that the Qur'an contains internally cancelled laws. This reading reflects Mannheim's assertion that identical texts can yield radically different meanings when interpreted within different social horizons.

In this light, Hasbi's concept of *naskh* functions less as a mechanism for eliminating revelation and more as an instrument of social reading. It enables interpreters to respond to historical change while maintaining theological commitments to the Qur'an's perfection and eternity. Such an approach aligns with Mannheim's socioanalytic method, which seeks to uncover how ideas emerge from specific constellations of social experience, intellectual struggle, and historical circumstance (Remmling, 2020).

Accordingly, Hasbi's rejection of literal *naskh* should be understood not as a denial of Islamic legal tradition, but as a sociologically grounded effort to reorient interpretive authority. By situating meaning within context rather than hierarchy, Hasbi transforms *naskh* from a doctrinal tool of closure into a hermeneutical strategy of openness. This interpretation confirms Mannheim's core thesis: that knowledge—including religious interpretation—is inseparable from the social conditions that give it life and direction.

D. Social and Intellectual Significance in the Indonesian Context

The interpretive pattern identified in Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's rejection of literal *naskh* carries profound social and intellectual significance when situated within the Indonesian context. Hasbi's *Tafsir an-Nur* did not emerge in a theoretical vacuum, but within the socio-historical conditions of post-independence Indonesia—a period marked by legal modernization, educational reform, and the urgent need to articulate an Islamic legal framework compatible with a plural and evolving society (Ash-Shiddiqy, 2000; Irfanuddin, 2023).

In the aftermath of independence, Indonesian Muslims faced the dual challenge of preserving religious authenticity while responding to modern socio-political realities. The inherited dominance of Middle Eastern fiqh paradigms, often applied uncritically, created tension between classical legal formulations and the lived experiences of Indonesian society. Hasbi perceived this condition as a form of intellectual stagnation, where divine *shari'a* was conflated with historically conditioned jurisprudence (*fiqh*), resulting in rigidity rather than guidance (Adnir & Syukri, 2020). His critique of *naskh* must therefore be understood as part of a broader project to reassert the Qur'an's relevance without undermining its normative authority.

From a social perspective, Hasbi's rejection of *naskh* as textual abrogation enables greater legal flexibility in addressing contemporary issues. By framing *naskh* as reconciliation (*tawfiq*), specification (*takhṣīṣ*), and contextual limitation (*taqyīd*), Hasbi opens interpretive space for Islamic law to respond to social change without resorting to claims of divine cancellation. This approach aligns with contemporary understandings of *naskh* as a dynamic response to evolving social conditions rather than a rigid hierarchical mechanism (Abdul-Rahim, 2017; Asman, 2021; Yaṣar & Nas, 2022). In plural societies such as Indonesia, where legal, cultural, and religious diversity coexist, such flexibility becomes essential for maintaining the Qur'an's ethical relevance.

Intellectually, Hasbi's tafsir represents a decisive shift in the function of interpretation itself. Tafsir is no longer merely a vehicle for reproducing inherited doctrines, but an arena of negotiation between sacred text and social reality. This reflects Mannheim's assertion that knowledge production is inseparable from historical context and social positioning (Vandenbergh, 2025; Hoenig, 2025). Hasbi's interpretive practice demonstrates that engaging the Qur'an critically does not weaken its authority; rather, it reinforces its capacity to guide communities across time and space.

Hasbi's role in this process can be characterized as that of a mediator between classical Islamic scholarship and local Indonesian needs. His strong pesantren background and deep respect for the Qur'an ensured continuity with the classical tradition, while his exposure to reformist thought, political engagement, and academic leadership enabled him to critically reassess inherited doctrines (Ash-Shiddiqy, 2000). This dual positioning allowed Hasbi to challenge legalistic rigidity without abandoning the epistemic foundations of Islamic jurisprudence.

Moreover, Hasbi's interpretive stance reflects a broader intellectual movement in Indonesia aimed at de-centering the assumption that Islamic authenticity must mirror Middle Eastern legal formulations. By emphasizing contextualization and socio-cultural relevance, Hasbi implicitly argues that Islamic law must be articulated through the lived realities of its adherents. This position resonates with Mannheim's socioanalytic emphasis on uncovering the worldview (*Weltanschauung*) of an era through its intellectual products.

In this sense, Hasbi's critique of *naskh* transcends a technical debate in *uṣūl al-fiqh*. It reflects a deeper intellectual struggle over authority, adaptability, and the future of Islamic thought in modern societies. His refusal to accept the erasure of Qur'anic verses safeguards the text's theological integrity, while his contextual hermeneutics ensure its ongoing social function. This balance between continuity and change underscores the enduring relevance of his tafsir within Indonesia's diverse and evolving Muslim landscape.

Thus, Hasbi's criticism of *naskh* embodies the modern Muslim need to read the sacred text contextually without sacrificing its normative legitimacy. This reflective insight provides a conceptual bridge to broader generalizations about Islamic interpretation in contemporary contexts, which will be elaborated in the following section.

E. Broader Implications for Qur'anic Studies and Islamic Legal Thought

The findings of this study allow for broader generalizations that extend beyond the Indonesian context and contribute to ongoing debates in Qur'anic studies and Islamic legal

thought. First, this research demonstrates that debates surrounding *naskh* are not merely theological or juridical in nature, but fundamentally epistemological and sociological. Competing interpretations of *naskh* reflect differing assumptions about the nature of revelation, authority, and the relationship between text and society. This confirms Karl Mannheim's assertion that knowledge—including religious interpretation—is never neutral, but always shaped by social location and historical experience (Gábor, 2019; Vandenberghe, 2025).

By applying Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, this study shows that *naskh* functions as an interpretive discourse embedded within particular social worlds. Classical formulations of *naskh*, which prioritize hierarchical abrogation and legal finality, may be understood as ideologically stabilizing mechanisms that preserved established scholarly authority within specific historical contexts (Burton, 2019; Langermann, 2024). In contrast, Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's non-abrogative and contextual interpretation represents a reformist-utopian orientation that seeks to transform legal reasoning while maintaining the Qur'an's normative integrity (As-Shiddieqy, 2009b; Asman, 2021). This analytical distinction reinforces Mannheim's conceptual differentiation between ideology and utopia as competing modes of knowledge production (Hammersley, 2022; Hempel, 2019).

From a methodological standpoint, the study underscores the relevance of the sociology of knowledge for reading Qur'anic exegesis across diverse local contexts. While this research focuses on Indonesia, its analytical framework is transferable to other Muslim societies where interpreters grapple with the tension between inherited legal traditions and contemporary social realities. Mannheim's emphasis on relationism—where meaning emerges through the interaction between text, interpreter, and context—provides a robust tool for examining how Qur'anic interpretation adapts across time and place (Hoenig, 2025; Vasegh & Mohammadi, 2022). As such, the sociology of knowledge offers a productive alternative to purely text-centric or normatively prescriptive approaches in Qur'anic studies.

For the field of Qur'anic exegesis, this study opens space for more systematic engagement with local and non-Arab tafsir traditions. Hasbi's *Tafsir an-Nur* illustrates that authoritative Qur'anic interpretation is not the exclusive domain of Middle Eastern scholarship, but can emerge meaningfully from peripheral or postcolonial contexts. This finding challenges implicit hierarchies within Islamic intellectual history and affirms the legitimacy of localized hermeneutical projects grounded in distinct socio-cultural experiences (Soleman & Tohis, 2022).

In terms of Islamic legal thought, Hasbi's approach offers an adaptive framework that avoids both rigid legalism and radical textual deconstruction. By interpreting *naskh* through *tawfiq*, *takhsis*, and *taqyid*, Hasbi demonstrates how legal reasoning can remain responsive to social change without negating the permanence of revelation (Yaşar & Nas, 2022; Abdul-Rahim, 2017). This model is particularly valuable for contemporary Muslim societies seeking to address modern legal and ethical challenges while maintaining continuity with the Qur'anic text.

More broadly, for the study of religion, this research highlights that religious authority is never fixed or absolute, but continuously negotiated through interpretive practices. Hasbi's critique of *naskh* reveals how exegetical authority is shaped by educational background, institutional affiliation, political engagement, and historical circumstance (Ash-Shiddiqy, 2000; Irfanuddin, 2023). In this sense, Qur'anic interpretation becomes a site where power, knowledge, and social change intersect—a dynamic that resonates strongly with Mannheim's socioanalytic insights (Asas et al., 2023; Remmling, 2020).

In conclusion, Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's *Tafsir an-Nur* exemplifies how reform in Islamic thought does not necessarily entail the rejection of tradition, but rather its rearticulation within new social horizons. His non-abrogative understanding of *naskh* demonstrates that fidelity to the Qur'an can coexist with interpretive flexibility and social relevance. As such, this study contributes to a growing body of scholarship that seeks to reconceptualize Qur'anic interpretation as a historically grounded, socially engaged, and intellectually dynamic endeavor.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that Teuku Muhammad Hasbi al-Shiddiqie's interpretation of *naskh* in *Tafsir an-Nur* represents a coherent and consistent non-abrogative paradigm rooted in contextual and reconciliatory hermeneutics. The most important finding of this research is that Hasbi does not reject the concept of *naskh* per se, but critically redefines it away from literal abrogation toward *tawfiq* (harmonization), *takhsis*, and *taqyid*. Through this approach, all Qur'anic verses retain their normative authority, while apparent textual tensions are resolved through contextual interpretation rather than legal annulment. This wisdom challenges the classical assumption that legal contradiction necessarily requires hierarchical cancellation, and instead affirms the Qur'an's internal coherence and enduring relevance across changing social conditions.

Scientifically, this article contributes to Qur'anic studies and Islamic legal theory by integrating Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as an analytical framework for interpreting exegetical thought. By situating Hasbi's critique of naskh within his socio-historical context—including postcolonial Indonesia, legal modernization, and debates on religious authority—this study demonstrates that Qur'anic interpretation is a socially conditioned form of knowledge rather than a neutral or purely textual enterprise. This contribution expands existing scholarship by (1) foregrounding Indonesian tafsir as a legitimate site of theoretical innovation, (2) reframing naskh as an epistemological and sociological issue rather than a solely juridical one, and (3) offering a transferable methodological model for studying local tafsir traditions beyond the Arab-Islamic heartlands.

Despite these contributions, this study has several limitations that open avenues for future research. First, the analysis focuses primarily on *Tafsir an-Nur* and selected works of Hasbi al-Shiddiqie, without conducting a comparative examination with other Indonesian or Southeast Asian exegetes who may share or contest similar non-abrogative positions. Second, while the sociology of knowledge provides a strong interpretive lens, further interdisciplinary engagement—such as discourse analysis or comparative legal anthropology—could deepen the understanding of how naskh operates in lived legal practices. Future research may also explore how Hasbi's interpretive legacy influences contemporary Indonesian Islamic jurisprudence and Qur'anic education, as well as how non-abrogative approaches to naskh are negotiated in other Muslim societies facing similar tensions between tradition and modernity.

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